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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
would be induced by the existence of the murder
charge. Therefore, while the inclusion of that
charge would constitute harmless error from the
state's viewpoint, it would not be so innocuous to
the defendant.
The Chief Justice could have merely ended his
decision at this point, reversing and remanding in
favor of the defendant. However, this would leave
both petitioner and respondent in a quandry.
Should Price be tried a third time? Burger asked
for post-argument memoranda from opposing
counsel in an effort to resolve this question. The
result was a remand to the Georgia courts for
judicial construction of their statutes.
It must be noted that Price v. Georgia did not,
in Burger's view, broaden the protection afforded
by the fifth amendment; it merely followed the
law established in Green. If this were the case,
Price could have easily been resolved by the trial
court. Instead it reached the Supreme Court be-
cause the state of the law was not as clear as
Burger would have one believe. The cases fall on
both sides of the issue. Kepner and Green favor the
petitioner. Trono and Brantley favor the state.
The facts of these cases are not distinguishable.
In essence, they all presented the same issue as
Price, but were decided in opposite ways.
Moreover, the reasoning found in the precedents
upon which Burger could rely proved unconvincing
and contrived. Neither the waiver theory of Trono,
nor the implicit acquittal theory of Green were
tenable.
Faced with these conflicting decisions, Burger
used Price not merely as an affirmation of the
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), puts the defendant through
two trials: one in which he is "implicitly acquitted" of
murder and convicted of manslaughter and a second,
as a result of a successful appeal, on the manslaughter
charge again. Both trials are final determinations of
different charges.
holding in Green but rather as a means to assure
that the prohibition against double jeopardy was
well defined and would therefore occupy a pre-
eminent place among the freedoms granted by the
Bill of Rights. 4 Indeed, he redefined the charac-
teristics of that guarantee against double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy applies to the possibility of second
punishment, not to its becoming a reality. It is the
threat of a second trial at which the constitutional
prohibition is aimed. In this context, a second
trial could never be "harmless error" even if the
same verdict obtained. Continuing jeopardy will
allow retrial after appeal on the charge appealed,
but not on a greater charge. The significance of
Price, therefore, is that it tends to clarify the law
of double jeopardy by settling some of the basic
issues left confused or unresolved by prior deci-
sions.
4The characteristics of double jeopardy set forth
or clarified by Chief Justice Burger in Price, do not
prohibit the imposition of a greater penalty for the
same offense upon subsequent retrial after appeal. North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 719 (1969) held:
Long established constitutional doctrine makes
clear that... the guarantee against doublejeopardy imposes no restrictions upon the length
of a sentence imposed upon reconviction.
That case held, however, that a greater sentence
cannot be used to punish the defendant for appealing
and getting the first conviction overturned.
A case similar to Pearce was decided one week before
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970). In Moon v.
Maryland, 398 U.S. 319 (1970), the Court held that
Pearce was to be retroactively applied. Justice Douglas
dissented to the holding in Moon and to the Peare-
doctrine.
He [the defendant] risks the maximum permissible
punishment when first tried. That risk having been
faced once need not be faced again. 398 U.S. at 321,
quoting 395 U.S. 711, 726-27.
Moon and Pearce concern the amount of punishment;
Price concerns the crime to be punished. It may be how-
ever, that this distinction is only one of form, not sub-
stance in its application. Harsher sentences may be
assessed on reconviction because the defendant could.
not be tried on a greater charge.
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)
In Illinois v. Allen' the Court held that a de-
fendant who, despite admonition from the bench,
engages in conduct so disruptive as to frustrate the
1397 U.S. 337 (1970). This decision was subjected to
extensive analysis by the attorneys for the State of
Illinois in, Flaum & Thompson, The Case of The Disrup-
tive Defendant: Illinois v. Allen, 61 J. Calm. L. C. &
P. S. 327 (1970).
ordinary course of his trial, may be held to have
lost his constitutional right to confront the wit-
nesses against him 2
William Allen was convicted for armed robbery
2 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him..."
[Vol. 61
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
in state court and sentenced to serve 10 to 30
years in the penitentiary. The conviction was
affirmed' and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
4
A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in
federal district court alleging that the defendant's
sixth amendment rights had been violated by his
removal from the courtroom during trial, despite
the fact that the expulsion was a result of the
defendant's disruptive conduct. The district court
dismissed the petition, but the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed,5 holding that a
criminal defendant had an unqualified right to be
present at every stage of his trial.' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari7 and reversed the decision,
holding that a trial judge, in the valid exercise of
his discretion, commits no constitutional violation
by expelling a disruptive defendant.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous
Court, conceded that the right of an accused to be
present at all stages of his trial was a constitutional
guarantee made obligatory on the states by the
fourteenth amendment s The notion, however,
that the guarantee of confrontation in the sixth
amendment was absolute and unqualified had
been previously rejected. 9 Therefore, the guarantee
could be lost by misconduct.0
Recognizing the Seventh Circuit's adherence to
the doctrine demanding the indulgence of every
reasonable presumption against the loss of con-
stitutional rights,n the Court intimated that the
precedents cited by the court of appeals did not
squarely face the issue, but rather concerned
situations in which the denial of the right to con-
frontation was more technical than discretionary. 2
' People v Allen, 37 Ill. 2d. 167, 226 N.E. 2d 1 (1967)
'389 U.S. 907 (1967)
5 United States ex rte. Allen v Illinois, 413 F. 2d 232
(7th Cir. 1969) (2-1 decision).
6 Id. at 234.
7396 U.S. 955 (1969).
8 397 U.S. at 338 (1970). The right of the accused to
be present at every stage of his trial was constitutionally
sanctioned in Lewis v United States, 146 U.S. 370
(1892), and made applicable to state prosecutions in
Pointer v Texas 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
' Diaz v United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
10 397 U.S. at 342 (1970) citing Mr. justice Cardozo's
opinion in Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1938).
Cf. F. R. Cur. P. 43:
[In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by
death, the defendant's voluntary absence after
the trial has been commenced in his presence shall
not prevent continuing the trial to and including
the return of the verdict.
1, Johnson v Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1968)
' United States ex rel. Allen v Illinois, 413 F.2d at
235 (1969). See Hopt v Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884)
(challenged jurors were tried for bias while the ac-
cused was not present); Shields v United States, 273
In reaching its conclusion the Court avoided the
concept of waiver based on voluntary absence'3 and
centered on the disastrous consequences to the
administration of justice that could result by
permitting an unqualified sixth amendment right:
[I1f our courts are to remain what the founders in-
tended, the citadels of justice, their proceedings
cannot and must not be infected With... scur-
rilous, abusive language and conduct... 14
Pursuing the principle, the Court outlined three
constitutionally permissible alternatives for deal-
ing with an obstreperous defendant:
1. Binding and gagging him.
2. Citing him for contempt.
3. Removing him from the courtroom. 5
Notwithstanding the constitutional sanctity of
the right to confrontation, 6 the discretionary
right of a trial judge to go forward with the pro-
ceedings where a defendant voluntarily absents
himself is well established. However, minimal
authority exists for extending the voluntary ab-
sence theory to the defendant who, warned that
repetition of his misconduct will result in expulsion,
continues the disruption and is expelled as a con-
U.S. 583 (1927) (court sent in instruction to the jury
without consulting the defendant or his attorney).
1 Voluntary absence would result from a repetition
of misconduct subsequent to a warning that continued
misconduct would merit expulsion. Thus, the voluntari-
ness of repeating the disruption makes the resulting
absence the product of a voluntary act. See notes 20-22
infra.
14 397 U.S. at 346 (1970).
15 Id. at 344.
16Engendered by well-founded anxiety about a
criminal defendant's ability to contend with unchal-
lenged evidence against him, the right to confrontation
was carried forward as a part of the common law and
absorbed into the Constitution. See F. HEraaM, TME
SixTH AmENDmENT To THE CoNsTiTuoN Or Tax
UaTED STATES, A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
OELNom 104 (1951). The rationale supporting the
right rests in the necessity to subject adverse testimony
to cross-examination. See S J. WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§1395 (3rd ed. 1940). This rationale is premised on the
belief that defense counsel cannot adequately impeach
the credibility of an adverse witness without the as-
sistance of the accused. See, e.g., Pointer v Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965); Turner v Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466
(1964); In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947); Kirby v
United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1898); Lewis v United
States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
"7See, e.g., Parker v United States, 184 F.2d 488
(4th Cir. 1950); Bemess v State, 83 So.2d 607 (Ala.
1953), noted 9 ALA. L. Rav. 96 (1956); State v McGinnis,
12 Idaho 336, 85 P. 1089 (1906); Cox v Hand, 185 Kan.
780, 347 P. 2d 265 (1959); State v Thompson, 56 N.D.
716, 219 N.W. 218 (1928); Ez parte Cassas, 112 Tex.
Crim. 100, 13 S W.2d 869 (1929); State v Aikers, 87
Utah 507, 51 P.2d 1052 (1935); State v Smith, 183
Wash. 136, 48 P.2d 58 (1935). State v Biller, 262 Wis.
472, 55 N.W. 2d 414 (1952).
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sequence of his voluntary act. s This theory is
supported by the rationale in United States v.
Davis,19 decided without reference to the sixth
amendment, and People v. DeSimone,2' where the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that the constitu-
tional right to confrontation2' could be waived.22
In its avoidence of the waiver theory or any
other doctrinal mechanism, the Court gave the
trial judge a wide latitude of discretion. This
discretion is tempered, however, by the require-
ment that the defendant be re-admitted upon his
expression of willingness to conform with proper
standards of behavior.23 Although failing to suggest
a system for applying the removal, restraint, and
contempt sanctions, the Court noted that binding
and gagging would be a last resort where absolutely
necessary to keep the defendant present, but did
not attempt to envision a situation in which this
might be done.24 Several disadvantages attach to
binding and gagging that do not attach to removal
or contempt.
The first disadvantage is the effect that the sight
of a shackled defendant would have on a jury's pre-
sumption of his innocence.2 Although some courts
have recommended that an insulating instruction
be given for the defendant's protection, 21 the
18 This theory was relied upon by the Supreme Court
of Illinois in the original disposition of Allen's appeal.
People v Allen, 37 Ill.2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
19 25 Fed. Cas. 773, 774 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1869);
The right of a prisoner to be present at his trial
does not include the right to prevent a trial by un-
seemly disturbance .... It does not lie in his mouth
to complain of the order which was made necessary
by his own misconduct, and which he could at any
time have terminated by signifying the willingness
to avoid creating [a] disturbance.
209 Ill. 2d 522, 533, 138 N.E.2d 556, 562 (1956):
It is obvious from the record that defendant's re-
moval was necessary to prevent such misconduct
as would obstruct the work of the court; such mis-
conduct was in turn, effective as a waiver of the
defendant's right to be present. The right to ap-
pear and defend is not given to a defendant to
prevent his trial either by voluntary absence, or
by wrongfully obstructing its progress.
This proposition is supported in dicta in Sahlinger v
People, 102 Ill. 241, 246 (1882). For comparative
purposes, see Regina v Berry, 104 L.T.J. 110 (North-
hampton Assizes 1897), noted, 11 HAnv. L. R1v. 409
(1898).
21 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 9.
2 See Murray, The Power to Expel a Criminal
Defendant from His Own Trial: A Comparative View.
36 U. Coo. L. REv. 174, 175 (1964).
20397 U.S. at 346.
24 Id. at 344.
25 See Comment, Handcuffing the Defendant During
the Trial, 8 St. Louis U. L. J. 401 (1968).
26 Rich v United States 261 F.2d 536, 538 (4th Cir.
1958); State v Sawyer, 60 Wash.2d 83, 85, 371 P.2d
932, 933 (1962).
bound defendant would, nevertheless, be a con-
tinuing physical influence. Secondly, the pres-
ence of a manacled defendant has a demeaning
effect upon the dignity and decorum of the
judicial process. 2 Finally, binding and gagging,
by its very purpose, destroys the efficacy of the
right it is invoked to protect. Since the right of
confrontation is given the criminal defendant in
order to allow him to consult with counsel for the
purpose of effective cross-examination, it is anoma-
lous to bind and gag him to preserve it. With the
possible exception of identification, the presence of
the defendant then seems more ceremonial than
effective.
Under certain circumstances the efficiency of
the judge's summary contempt powers would also
be subject to several limitations. A defendant
intent upon disrupting his trial for publicity pur-
poses may not feel compelled to alter his conduct
under threat of a contempt citation.28 Likewise,
imprisoning an unruly defendant for contumacious
conduct and suspending his trial in the interim
may serve as a tactical advantage to the defendant
who might profit by the subsequent unavailability
of an adverse witness.29 Also, certain defendants,
especially those facing capital or other severe
punishment, may not be restrained by the con-
tempt power.
In contrast to the use of restraints or contempt,
removing an obstreperous defendant offers him
neither tactical advantage nor publicity, nor does
it force the court to proceed with the spectacle of a
21397 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring):
In particular shackling and gagging is surely the
least acceptable of these. It offends not onlyjudicial dignity and decorum, but also that respect
for the individual which the lifeblood of the law.
28 In United States v. Dellinger, No. 69 CR 180(N.D. Ill.), a mistrial was declared with respect to
defendant Seale and he was summarily sentenced on
sixteen separate specifications of contempt. Because
the trial judge was bound by the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Allen, the Supreme Court not having re-
versed at the time of trial, Seale could not be removed.
Thus, when warning of future contempt citations and
binding and gagging proved ineffective to halt the dis-
ruption, the court had no alternative but to declare a
mistrial and utilize the summary contempt power under
F.R.Cinr.P. 42(a) in order to insure a fair trial for
the remaining codefendants. While summary punish-
ment has been held the appropriate remedy for extreme
cases such as Seale's, e.g., Sacher v. United States 343
U.S. 1 (1952), it appears that the Supreme Court, in
retaining binding and contempt as proper measures for
dealing with a disruptive defendant, clearly anticipated
Seale's forthcoming appeal. Since removal is a more
effective expedient, it appears that the Seale situation,
although quite proper under the circumstances, will
remain an orphan in the law.
29 397 U.S. at 345 (1970).
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